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Elite Scientists and the Global Brain Drain 
 
 
Summary 
 
  
There are signs – one is world university league tables – that people increasingly think 
globally when choosing the university in which they wish to work and study. This 
paper is an exploration of data on the international brain drain. We study highly-cited 
physicists, highly-cited bio-scientists, and assistant professors of economics. First, we 
demonstrate that talented researchers are being systematically funnelled into a small 
number of countries. Among young economists in the top American universities, for 
example, 75% did their undergraduate degree outside the United States. Second, the 
extent of the elite brain drain is considerable. Among the world’s top physicists, 
nearly half no longer work in the country in which they were born. Third, the USA 
and Switzerland are per capita the largest net-importers of elite scientists. Fourth, we 
estimate the migration ‘funnelling coefficient’ at approximately 0.2 (meaning that 
20% of top researchers tend to leave their country at each professional stage). Fifth, 
and against our prior expectations, the productivity of top scientists, as measured by 
the Hirsch h-index, is similar between the elite movers and stayers. Thus it is 
apparently not true that it is disproportionately the very best people who emigrate. 
Sixth, there is extreme clustering of ISI Highly Cited Researchers into particular 
fields in different universities.  Seventh, we debate the questions: are the brain drain 
and this kind of funnelling good or bad for the world, and how should universities and 
governments respond?  
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Elite Scientists and the Global Brain Drain 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is evening. There is snow on the ground. Inside, a grey-haired Englishman in a 
white bow tie steps forward, and Anthony Leggett lifts something small into the air. 
Photographers strain forward and the gold of the Nobel Prize in Physics flashes back 
from his hand. A second Englishman, Peter Mansfield, emerges from the wings. This 
time it is the Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine that is held toward the cameras. 
A third Briton joins them. Amid Swedish and foreign reporters, Clive Granger raises 
aloft the Nobel Prize in Economics. The date is December 10, 2003. Next morning, 
the readers of The New York Times learn little of the trio’s common birthplace. 
Instead they discover, correctly, that Americans again scooped the bulk of the Nobel 
awards in Stockholm, but that an elderly medical scientist from England received one. 
By then, Professor Anthony Leggett, born a Londoner, is en route back to his 
laboratory in Illinois. Professor Clive Granger, originally from Swansea, is sitting 
westbound on an aeroplane and writing the next of his University of California 
lectures. 
 
This is a study of the brain drain and why it may matter. We examine the migration 
decisions made by some of the world’s most creative scientists. Our paper lays out 
data on the mobility of three kinds of university researchers. Its focus is senior 
physicists, senior bio-scientists, and assistant professors in the top American 
economics departments. In this way, we hope the paper provides a flavour of science 
and social science, and of old and young.  
 
Our data on senior physicists and bio-scientists are drawn from the ISI Web of 
Science database known as www.isihighlycited.com. This lists the world’s most-cited 
people across a range of 21 subject fields. The database seems particularly valuable, 
even though it is still relatively un-exploited, as a source of information on scientists, 
both because of the talented nature of the group (many of the men and women in our 
data set are likely to go on to win Nobel Prizes) and because it is possible to link 
bibliometrically to most of these scientists’ published articles. Information on factors 
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such as the citations h-index, as suggested by Hirsch (2005), can thereby be studied 
directly. Although it has recently become possible to draw upon Google Scholar to 
construct h-indexes, in this paper we rely on data from ISI.       
 
The paper is interested in a number of questions: 
 
• Among elite scientists, how strong is the world’s brain drain? 
• Is it disproportionately the very best researchers who migrate? 
• Why are certain countries successful at attracting top scientists? Should 
governments try particularly to retain young stars, and if so how might they 
do so? 
• Is the brain drain beneficial for the world as a whole or merely good for the 
acquiring country (often, in our data, the United States)? Can we quantify the 
nature of the loss to a donor nation? 
• How can we measure the average quality of movers compared to stayers? 
• How much ‘clustering’ of elite scientists is there? In other words, do 
particular universities attract star researchers if they already have brilliant 
people in those particular fields? 
• Might clustering create too much conformity of thinking? 
• If increased publicity given to world rankings of university-quality 
encourages more international mobility in the future, what are the policy 
implications of the brain drain, if any, for the welfare of the world as a 
whole? 
• Should individual governments have policies to slow the elite brain drain? 
• How ought a university to react strategically to the existence of these kinds of 
brain drain pressures? 
 
We believe these questions are important. Our paper provides evidence relevant to 
some, and speculates on others, although we shall not be able definitively to answer 
all of them. 
 
Part of our aim is to measure the productivity of researchers. There are two main 
ways to do this. One is to count the number of papers produced by a scholar. The 
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other is to count a scholar’s citations (that is, the number of times that he or she is 
referenced in others researchers’ bibliographies). We adopt principally the latter. 
Particular emphasis is given here to a scholar’s h-index. An h-index is a summary 
statistic that is becoming widely used in bibliometric inquiries. A scholar who has 
published Z papers each of which has been cited at least Z times is said to have an h-
value of Z. It tells us in a quick way how highly cited a person is, and is calculated by 
rank-ordering a scholar’s journal papers by how many times each paper has been 
cited, and then solving for the highest integer defined by the equality: the number of 
cites = the number of that paper in the rank ordering. For example, consider 
someone who had published eight journal articles that have been cited respectively 0 
times, 0 times, 0 times, 3 times, 4 times, 5 times, 6 times and 7 times. This scholar’s 
h-index would be 4. Such a person has published 4 articles cited at least 4 times. 
 
Nevertheless, other approaches are possible.  Hence at one or two points in the paper 
we use, as an alternative, the total number of lifetime citations to an individual’s 
work. 
 
One potential weakness of our analysis ought be acknowledged from the outset. 
Because we shall be using data from ISI, this paper will concentrate on scientific 
work published in English-language research articles. As in so much bibliometric 
analysis, this leads to an undercounting of research results written only in other 
languages. At the time of writing, it is not possible to correct in a systematic way for 
this bias, although in the long run it may be that exactly comparable citations indexes 
in other languages will be developed.   
 
2. The Brain Drain: Background 
 
Higher education is big business. More than 2 million European Union students 
graduate each year, and approximately 2 million also do so in the United States. 
Despite this, the EU employs many fewer researchers per 1,000 workers (5.4%) in 
the labour force when compared to the US (8.7%): see the data in Woods (2003). The 
measured trans-Atlantic drain is numerically fairly small and has been estimated to 
be 0.5%-1% (Saint-Paul, 2004). Nevertheless, the migrants are top performers within 
their fields. When only considering the United States labour force with doctoral 
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degrees in the Science and Engineering field, 29% of those conducting R&D are 
foreign-born (Johnson and Regets, 1998).  
 
In 2001, the European Council of Ministers adopted ‘The Barcelona Objective’, 
stating that all EU members should spend a minimum of 3% of GDP on research by 
2010 (EC, 2002). At that point, the EU was estimated to spend 1.9%, compared to 
the US’s value of 2.8%. This strategy was meant to create 400,000 new jobs for 
European scientists every year (Woods, 2003). Yet, by 2003, only a few countries 
had met the criteria. The gap between EU and US research spending continues to 
widen. 
 
The concept of the ‘brain drain’ – the intellectual seepage from a country caused by 
the emigration of highly-educated personnel – is now a fairly old one. It appears to 
have gained currency in the 1960s following the prominence given to the 
phenomenon by a report published by the Royal Society (Royal Society, 1963). That 
report tried to measure the exodus of British scientists to the United States. Early 
research on the subject was principally concerned with the emigration of academics 
and professionals from developing to developed countries, and the possible negative 
impacts of this migration on the social and economic development of the countries of 
origin (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Hamada, 1977; McCullock and Yellen, 1977). 
  
Since then, the focus of study has shifted. It has come to take into account a wider 
understanding of the international mobility of elites, and the conventional wisdom that 
the brain drain is always negative for the development of source countries has now 
been displaced in favour of the related concept that it is necessary to balance also the 
benefits of ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circulation’. This new perspective is demonstrated 
through more recent literature in the field, which posits that – at least in the case of 
larger developing countries with an intermediate level of income – the emigration of 
intellectual capital, and the prospect of migration, has the potential to encourage 
human capital formation through inducing greater educational aspirations and 
additional investment in education, and additionally that past skilled emigration 
significantly increases a country’s chances of attracting foreign direct investment in 
the subsequent period through skilled migrants’ active participation in facilitating 
such transfers between their host and home countries (Commander, Kangiasniemi and 
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Winters, 2003; Kugler and Rapoport, 2007; Meyer, 2001; Mountford, 1997; Beine, 
Docquier and Rapoport 2001, 2007). Beyond diaspora externalities and the effects of 
the raising of expected returns to education, a number of authors have also discussed 
the relatively short-term nature of movements in pursuit of career development, the 
higher incidence of migration among potential rather than established elites, and the 
increasing characterisation of the movements of the highly-educated as circulation 
and mobility rather than migration (e.g. Bekhradnia and Sastry, 2005; Gaillard and 
Gaillard, 1997; Laudel, 2005; Meyer, 2001; UUK, 2007).  
 
In the early literature, quantitative measurements of the magnitude of the brain drain 
were uncommon. More recently, empirical studies have begun to emerge. Carrington 
and Detragiache’s (1998, 1999) work was pioneering. It provided skilled migration 
rates for 61 developing countries in 1990 by using US census and OECD migration 
statistics. Notwithstanding the limitations of the data and methodology, as detailed by 
Docquier and Rapoport (2007), the report of Carrington and Detragiache 
demonstrated a substantial brain drain to the United States, particularly from small 
countries in Africa, Central America and the Caribbean and amounting to a significant 
share of the educated workforces of these nations. Docquier and Marfouk (2004, 
2006) extended and refined Carrington and Detragiache’s work. They offered new 
estimates of skilled migration rates for some 170 countries in 1990 and 190 countries 
in 2000 in both developing and developed countries. The Docquier-Marfouk dataset 
covered 92.7% of the OECD immigration stock for the relevant periods, and 
demonstrated that a substantial increase in the magnitude of the brain drain in 
Western and Eastern Africa and Central America had been experienced over the 
decade in question, although significant differences remained between regions and 
countries, with the highest brain drain rates observed in small countries in the 
Caribbean, Central America and Africa. 
 
What seems clear from the available literature, including quantitative measurements 
thereof, is that studies tend to cover migration of the generally highly-educated across 
a range of employment sectors, or have a focus on specific countries or regions. Our 
paper aims to examine the brain drain with specific reference to elite academics on a 
global level. The role of the United States, as a nation that gathers up many of these 
talented people, is a specific focus of our paper. 
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Pierson and Cotgreave (2000) examined the mobility of scientists who had obtained 
their doctorates from the UK in 1988 and who continued to be active in their fields at 
the time of analysis. Each scientist was checked against the Science Citation Index 
(SCI) of the ISI for the period 1985-1989. All first-authored papers published during 
this period, together with the number of citations received by each article up to and 
including May 2000, were recorded. The continuing activity of researchers was 
established: SCI data provided a check on publication records and current country of 
abode. Of the 252 scientists tracked, the majority had most recently published from a 
UK address (62%), while 17% were now based in the US and 21% elsewhere in the 
world. No significant statistical difference was found between the number of articles 
by scientists publishing from UK addresses and those publishing from the US (2.40 
0.24 publications per person vs. 2.07 0.43). However, the mean number of citations 
per article for scientists who had moved to the US was found to be significantly 
higher than that for UK ‘stayers’. Although Pierson and Cotgreave emphasise that this 
does not represent conclusive proof of a significant brain drain, they nevertheless 
present their findings as cause for concern. They suggest that British scientists with 
the most potential are emigrating to the US. 
  
Although the methodological detail provided by Pierson and Cotgreave is sketchy, 
their findings are nevertheless in line with those of more fully explained studies 
presented by Stephan and Levin (Levin and Stephan, 1999; Stephan and Levin, 2001) 
and Ioannidis (2004).  
 
Stephan and Levin (Levin and Stephan, 1999; Stephan and Levin, 2001) examined 
whether the foreign-born and foreign-educated were disproportionately represented 
among individuals making exceptional contributions to science and engineering in the 
United States. The following illustrative criteria were used to identify data subjects: 
individuals elected to the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and/or National 
Academy of Engineering (NAE); authors of citation classics (journal articles 
identified by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) as having a ‘lasting effect on 
the whole of science’); authors of hot papers (‘journal articles published during the 
most recent two-year period that in the most recent two-month period have attracted 
significantly more attention than papers of the same age in the same field’ 
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(http://scientific.thomson.com/products/sw-hp/)); the 250 ISI most-cited researchers; 
authors of highly-cited patents; and scientists who had played a key role in the launch 
of bio-technology firms making an initial public offering from March 1990 through to 
November 1992. In the case of citation classics and hot papers, further distinctions 
were made between first authors and non-first authors. The resultant dataset was 
populated with biographical data drawn from available sources as well as via 
questionnaire returns. Subsequent statistical analysis of each indicator of scientific 
achievement revealed that, setting aside some variation by discipline, and with the 
sole exception of hot papers in the life sciences, elite scientists in the US were 
disproportionately represented by the foreign-born as well as by those educated 
abroad, both at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. 
 
Bibliometric methods were also used by Ioannidis (2004) to evaluate the magnitude of 
the brain drain. He analysed data on 1523 of the ISI most-cited scientists for 1981-
1999, using the data to determine the proportion of scientists born in a different 
country from where they were currently residing and controlling for the potential 
impact of the relative representation of different scientific fields in the sample 
analysed. Ioannidis found that, regardless of the analysis used, about a third of elite 
scientists globally had emigrated from their countries of birth (approximately three-
quarters to the US), though there was considerable variability in the rate of foreign-
born scientists across scientific fields and among developed countries. In the case of 
the latter, foreign-born highly-cited scientists accounted for about a third of scientists 
resident in the US, Australia, Switzerland, Israel, France and the Netherlands, with 
significantly lower proportions reflected in the UK (24%) and Germany (19%), a 
significantly higher proportion in Canada (64%), and no foreign-born highly-cited 
scientists in any country not belonging to an ‘established market economy’1, apart 
from Singapore. Notably, only 2% of US-born scientists had emigrated, against 
emigration rates of 20%-86% for other countries. Ioannidis further noted that “under 
conditions of equity at a global level, the number of native top scientists in each 
country should be proportional to the population” (Ioannidis, 2004: 938). Adjusting 
for population, it was found that the number of native highly-cited scientists was at 
least 75% in only 8 countries apart from the US. A further observation of concern was 
                                                 
1 United Nations (1981-1986) Annual Demographic Reports. United Nations, Geneva. 
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that, using the US-born scientists as a reference point, 89% of individuals with the 
potential to make an impact comparable to that of the highly-cited scientists in 
Ioannidis’ sample had not in fact attained this level of achievement. Another of his 
findings was that countries without an existing critical mass of native scientists – 
including developed nations – lost most scientists to migration.  
 
In discussing the implications of these global estimates of elite migration, Ioannidis 
presents his findings as indicative of an increasing exodus of top scientists, citing the 
likelihood that the rate of progress of scientific growth has a direct and exponential 
relationship with the critical mass of scientists in a country. His nod to the advantages 
associated with the migration of scientists is, however, set aside in favour of a strong 
emphasis on the draining of scientific potential and the consequent developmental 
stagnation caused by these global inequalities. 
 
The above studies provide quantitative evidence for the brain drain of highly-cited 
scientists. Yet methodological difficulties have been pointed out by Laudel (2003) in 
relation to the approaches taken by (for e.g.) Stephan and Levin and by Pierson and 
Cotgreave. Laudel argues that an investigation of elite mobility must necessarily solve 
the three methodological problems of delineating a specialty, identifying a specialty’s 
elite and identifying international mobility and migration. The delineation of 
specialties is only roughly achieved by Stephan and Levin and not undertaken at all in 
Pierson and Cotgreave’s work. In terms of ascertaining mobility, the sources of 
biographical data on scientists used to achieve this (e.g. the Internet, questionnaires, 
encyclopaedias of scientists, grant applications, etc.) are highlighted by Laudel, who 
cites incomplete access and incomplete data. Finally, with regard to the identification 
of the elite, Laudel mentions a number of issues that have been raised about the use of 
bibliometrics to measure scientific excellence (e.g. Van Raan, 2000; Tussen, Visser 
and Van Leeuwen, 2002). The issues include (given the extent of co-authorship in the 
sciences) the utility of citation classics and hot papers as reliable measures of the 
quality of a single scientist, as well as measurement problems with homonyms in the 
ISI data (notwithstanding some attempts to correct for this by Stephan and Levin). 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out Ioannidis’ (2004) argument that “despite the 
debates concerning the limitations of citation analyses and the inability to find a 
perfect means for weighting research accomplishments (…) the number of citations is 
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a useful surrogate of scientific impact” (Ioannidis 2004: 936). There are of course also 
other limitations with the studies in question – Pierson and Cotgreave’s article, for 
example, lacks information on the nationality of the individuals included in their 
dataset, which arguably weakens the implications of their findings.  
 
Laudel presents a detailed discussion of the tests conducted in her study to address the 
issues identified with delineation and identification of the elite and their mobility – 
while a range of potential solutions were covered, a combination of elite conference 
participation (the Gordon conferences) and an analysis of citations within the sample 
of active conference participants was found a promising approach (though not 
applicable to all specialties). A test study was conducted using the “Angiotensin” 
Gordon Conferences. The results from this showed that, of the 131 Angiotensin 
scientists investigated, 59 had always been in the US and 34 had moved to the US, out 
of which 16 had moved back to their countries after a temporary stay (supporting the 
characterisation of elite mobility as circulation) and 18 (approximately 14% of the 
sample) were still resident in the US, the majority of whom appeared to have migrated 
permanently based on their length of stay. A further 3 scientists had emigrated from 
the US to other countries. The remaining 35 had been resident in, or had moved to 
countries other than, the US. Laudel interprets her findings as confirming a putative 
brain drain towards the US. 
  
This kind of research gives some credence to the contention that there is an increasing 
clustering of elite scientists in established centres of academe. This emphasises the 
degree of separation with countries in which a paucity of top researchers already 
exists. A perpetuation of the cycle of concentration of excellence and the 
corresponding scientific deficit elsewhere in the world is unexceptional. Mahroum 
(2000), for instance, argues that academics move close to centres of academic power 
and excellence, an assertion supported by empirical research undertaken by Millard 
(2005) which demonstrates that the location decisions of scientists are taken in the 
context of the prestige, visibility and networking potential of centres or clusters. As 
noted by Laudel (2005: 393), “…it follows that ’elite production’ is autocatalytic, and 
that a country needs elites to generate elites”. 
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What implications does this have for the world? It seems from the literature that 
documentation of the extent of the brain drain in general – not just from developing 
nations to established market economies but also between OECD countries – has 
shown an increase in the magnitude in this phenomenon. Although it is clear that 
there is an increasing need to factor in the impact of return migration and brain 
circulation, the net effect still appears to be of the ‘drain’ variety – particularly 
towards the US. Yet the implications of this are mixed. As far as return migration is 
concerned, there is limited evidence that this is significant among the highly skilled, 
unless sustained growth has preceded return (Docquier and Rapoport, 2007). For 
example, while less than 20% of Taiwanese and Korean Science and Engineering 
PhDs graduating from US universities in the 1970s originally returned to their home 
countries (e.g. Kwok and Leland, 1982), this proportion increased to two-thirds 
during the course of the 1990s following prolonged periods of significant growth in 
these countries (e.g. Song, 1997). Such a finding indicates that return skilled 
migration may be more a consequence of rather than a trigger for the development of 
sending nations. It also appears to be the case that, as demonstrated by Beine, 
Docquier and Rapoport (2007), while there is clear empirical support for the potential 
positives associated with elite emigration, this is limited to larger countries combining 
low levels of human capital and low skilled migration rates. In a comparison of 
‘winners’ versus ‘losers’ on a country-by-country basis, there are markedly more of 
the latter – comprised particularly of small countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Central America. More importantly, however, the latter group are also shown to 
experience substantive losses against the former’s non-negligible gains.  
 
Looked at from another perspective, however, it is possible to conceive of Pierson and 
Cotgreave’s (2000) finding that the mean number of citations per article for scientists 
who had moved to the US was found to be significantly higher than that for UK 
‘stayers’ as evidence contributing to the view that emigration may be beneficial for 
one’s research. By extrapolation, the brain drain might conceivably be beneficial for 
the scientific community as a whole. As Millard (2005: 357) notes, researchers’ 
location decisions are influenced by their networks, and, citing Grabher (1993) – 
“underlin(ing) the importance of being involved in international collaborations and 
networks which – partly through the mobility of researchers – provide a constant 
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inflow of new ideas, facilitating the maintenance of the competitiveness of research 
groups, institutes and clusters”. 
 
 
Sample 1: Young Economists 
 
We begin with information on elite young American economists. We obtained our 
data in a simple way: it was done by collating, and examining the patterns in, the 
curriculum vitae (CVs) of all assistant professors in the top-10 departments in the 
US.  The departments are listed in Table 1. We treat these individuals as data points. 
Because of their youth, arguably these people give us a glimpse of the future of 
academic economics.2   We find evidence of a strong ex post brain drain – a 
funnelling of talent into the United States – at the bachelor-degree level. The typical 
assistant professor has a BSc from outside the US.   
 
Our data set on young economists was compiled in January/February 2007. In total, 
we obtained biographies (usually by reading CVs on the web) on 112 assistant 
professors. We gathered primary data on assistant professors from the ten highest-
ranked economics departments in the US. The departments were chosen using 
www.econphd.net. Stanford University has the highest number in the sample with 16 
and the University of Chicago the fewest with 6 assistant professors. In our data, 
there are 26 women.  We documented both the research areas and research styles of 
the economists (not reported here but available on request). Information is missing 
for three assistant professors, one in Harvard, Stanford and New York University 
respectively, which decreases our effective sample size to 109. People’s main areas 
of research were recorded. Data on gender were also collected.  
 
Our results reveal ex post a striking brain drain. Only 25% of the sample had 
obtained their first degree in the US (Chart 1a), and 87% got their PhD there (Chart 
1b). Assistant-professor positions are not evenly distributed between the genders: 
24% are female and 76% male. Charts 1c and 1d give more detail on the exact 
                                                 
2 We do not focus on the US to downplay the vitality and importance of young European scholars. 
Rather, our gathering of data stemmed from a project designed to measure international flows of 
scientists into the United States.  
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countries of origin. These findings are broadly consistent with concerns expressed, in 
for example Machin and Oswald (2000) and Neary et al (2003), about the growing 
dominance of US economics departments in academic economics research. 
 
What is harder to say, when examining a selection of young researchers like these, is 
how migration and productivity are linked. For that, data on an older group of 
scholars is required. Our next two samples offer that. 
 
Sample 2: Senior Physicists 
 
Here our sample of researchers is taken from the ISI’s list of highly cited physicists 
on www.isihighlycited.com. At the time of data collection, this contained a list of the 
272 most-cited people in scholarly physics journals between 1981 and 1999. Laudel 
(2003, p.219) points out that the ISI’s subject groupings are not broken down into 
specialities and therefore true in-depth analysis of ‘cause and consequences’ of 
migration cannot be analysed. However, data on these factors, such as R&D funding, 
does not have sufficient coverage over physics, let alone its specialities, for that depth 
of analysis to be undertaken and therefore the sample used is considered to be 
appropriate. Laudel (2003, p.223) also argues that, once specialities have been 
identified, citation counts alone do not uniquely identify the elite. However, Ioannidis 
(2004) also uses highly cited scientists in his sample and argues that they “represent a 
reliable sample of largely top researchers with major impact in their field” and this 
view is also taken in this paper. The physicists in the sample are the most ‘visible’ 
(Cole and Cole 1968, p.400) between these years. Even if they cannot be defined 
uniquely as the elite, they are an important group.  
 
We created a data set on physicists. Biographical and bibliometric information for the 
272 physicists was researched to determine career movements and overall career 
productivity. The year and place of birth, first degree and PhD were recorded - so too 
was country of current affiliation. Data were initially gathered from the ISI website 
and from the physicists’ own webpages. This was followed by a further search of the 
Internet.  
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We sent emails to 146 physicists whose email addresses were identified. Of these, 63 
scientists replied with further information about themselves. Sufficient data were 
found for 158 of the physicists, although information on first degrees is only available 
for 150 of them. Further data for the countries of origin and current affiliation was 
collected from OECD Statistics. All variables were averaged between 1970 and 2006 
to cover the main period during which the physicists were active, the mean year of 
first degree being 1968 and 1973 for PhD. Data were available for 21 countries3. Data 
for the missing countries4 were not collected from other sources (in order to maintain 
consistency in data-gathering). 
 
These physicists are currently affiliated to 16 different countries. This leads to some 
language difficulties. Websites could only be read perfectly in English and Italian, 
although some online translators were used. Emails were sent in English, and this may 
have affected response from those in non-English speaking countries. To examine a 
possible bias towards English-speaking countries, the proportions of the final 158 
physicists are compared to those of the original 272. The USA is the only 
substantially overrepresented country, with 17 more physicists; and Japan is 
underrepresented by 9 physicists. The other countries varied from their expected 
number by one or two, although in some cases this is still a large portion of their 
representation. There is no way to solve this problem, and the response rate (43%) 
was similar to those of previous studies (Laudel 2003, p.224). This is considered 
when interpreting later results. 
 
Chart 2 reveals a remarkable funnelling of scientific talent into the United States. Of 
our 158 highly-cited scientists, 70% were born outside the USA. At the BSc level of 
their education, that had fallen to 57% of these people being outside America. By the 
year they came to do their PhD, the majority of these scientists were in the United 
States. The 70% had become 45%. Finally, when we observe where they work today, 
only 34% are working outside the United States.   
 
                                                 
3   Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA 
4    Israel, Argentine, Chile, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Iran, Taiwan 
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Charts 3a and 3b classify the data by region of donor country and recipient country.  
As can be seen, in terms of per-capita the big importers of brain power in the world 
are Switzerland and the USA. This may be because of the high professorial salaries 
paid in these nations, or because of generous scientific funding, or for a mixture of 
these reasons. Charts 4 and 5 are illustrations for Germany and the UK respectively. 
Charts 6a and 6b give further detail.   
 
We would like to know whether it is the most talented who tend to leave a country. 
The next issue in data collection, therefore, was in calculating productivity levels. The 
ISI Web of Knowledge was used to calculate the h-index (as a reminder, an h-index of 
20, say, means that a researcher has written at least 20 papers that are each cited at 
least 20 times). This required us initially to identify each physicist’s publication list, 
which can be problematic when many physicists have similar names. Laudel (2003, 
p.232) examines this issue and carried out further analysis of publication lists and co-
authors to ensure that only the correct scientist’s work was included. In our study, 
each individual was considered separately. In some cases, initial inspection showed 
no problems: physicists had identified how many papers they had published. 
However, in some cases, further examination of the exact names used on published 
papers and identifying the institutions worked for had to be undertaken in order to 
obtain the publication list. In two cases, physicists were eventually removed from our 
sample due to our lack of confidence in the measurements. In bibliometrics, total 
citation counts often contain errors caused by homonyms. The impact of 
misspecification is considered less problematic with the h-index: the probability of a 
second physicist with the same surname and initials appearing within the relatively 
small selection of papers which affect the h-index score is lower than for an entire list 
of people and publications.    
 
The sample of 158 physicists contains 1 female, and 8 of our 158 have won Nobel 
Prizes (see appendix 1, tables 15a and 15b). Of the total number, 61.4% have worked 
in multiple countries and 97.5% have worked in multiple institutions. Currently, 76% 
are affiliated to a university, 17% to other types of public institutions and 7% are in 
private institutions. Regarding the span of their careers, 96% have, at some point, 
worked in academia since obtaining their PhD; 54% have experienced another type of 
public institution; and 47% have spent a period in the private sector. The average 
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number of institutions worked in is 6.03, and the average number of countries worked 
in is 2.41, with maximum values of 25 and 12 respectively. These ISI Highly Cited 
Researcher physicists were born in 32 different countries. They studied for their first 
degree in 30 different countries. They did PhDs in 22 countries. They are presently 
located in only 16 countries. This shows a funnelling, at the country level, of 
approximately 50% from birth to the present day.  
 
The percentage of physicists present now in each country reveals that the principal 
funnelling effect is towards the USA. Table 2 demonstrates that at birth, 29.7% of 
physicists were in the USA, which increases to 43.4% at first degree, 55.1% at PhD 
and to 67.1% presently. The proportion in the 2nd and 3rd ranked countries falls by 
approximately 3 percentage points from birth to present day, with the share in the rest 
of the world falling dramatically from 50% at birth to only 19.6% presently. 
 
Overall, 44% of scientists have moved since birth (see Table 3). These findings are 
only a little different from those of Ioannidis (2005), who found that 50% of his 
physicists had moved since birth. The difference is partly attributable to the larger 
sample size in this paper: 158 scientists compared to 46 scientists in Ioannidis’ work. 
 
Summary statistics for these people’s citation levels can be seen in Table 4. The 
average h-index in the sample is approximately 59, with minimum and maximum 
values of 22 and 115 respectively. In order to examine the effect of co-authorship, the 
number and countries of the co-authors of ten randomly selected physicists in the 
sample was examined (results not reported but available upon request). The number 
of co-authors for each of the ten varies extraordinarily from approximately 3 to 366 
and the number of affiliated countries from 1 to 7. Although there is a tendency for 
those with more co-authors to have higher h-indexes, the evidence is not substantial. 
This seems to reinforce the previous decision to not adjust h-indexes for co-
authorship. 
 
These h-index results were compared with the total number of published papers, total 
citations, and average citation count. There is no correlation with average citations per 
paper, a significant correlation of 0.40 with total number of published papers, and of 
0.54 with total citations. 
 17
 
Chart 7 shows that those who currently work in the USA have an h-index which is on 
average 5.71 points higher than those in the non-USA institutions. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Breaking the non-USA sample down further 
leads to very small sample sizes, unfortunately, which makes statistical tests less 
effective. There are several possible reasons for this apparent higher productivity, one 
of which is that people working in the USA in a dense academic market cite each 
other more often for purely sociological reasons. 
 
Are movers of higher quality as physicists than those who choose to stay in their own 
country? Separating the sample into those who have migrated and those who have not 
– since either birth, BSc or PhD – shows no statistically significant difference in 
productivity levels (see Table 5), although there is no perfect way of measuring the 
productivity levels in the alternative situation. This result tentatively suggests that the 
act of migration itself may not increase productivity (see, however, Appendix 2 for 
some qualitative interview insights from scientists within this sample).  
 
Sample 3: Senior Bio-scientists 
 
Our third group of researchers is drawn from bio-science. This group of researchers 
numbers 163 people. More precisely, they are all ISI Highly Cited Researchers in the 
ISI field defined as ‘Biology and Biochemistry’. Moreover, this time our sample is 
taken entirely from scientists currently working in the United States. Hence the 
sampling is somewhat like that for our economists, but with the additional feature 
that all had to be HiCi researchers to be included.  
 
Chart 8a documents data on all those in our sample who moved into the USA. The 
chart summarises, for the individuals on whom we have information, the cross-
national distribution of their countries of birth. As with physics, these talented 
individuals come from a host of different birth nations. It can be seen in Chart 8a that 
Japan is the major donor country (with 7 bio-scientists moving from this country), 
followed by the UK and Canada (with 5 each). Chart 8b captures the movement data 
on those who went to the United States after their PhD.  
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In Chart 9, we plot the numbers of bio-scientists, at different stages of their 
professional lives. The general pattern is reminiscent of those for the economists and 
physicists. Once again, North America soaks up, at each successive stage, a larger 
and larger number of the elite science researchers. For our sample: 
 
% bio-scientists working now in the USA and born in the USA: 60%  
% bio-scientists working now in the USA and BSc in USA: 70%  
% bio-scientists working now in the USA and PhD in USA: 72%  
% bio-scientists working now in the USA: 100%  
 
Greater detail is set out in Chart 9. 
 
3. Funnelling and h-index Productivity 
 
In Tables 6a and 6b, we take a closer look at migration at different stages of a 
person’s professional career. We capture this with what we call a funnelling 
coefficient. This measures the proportion of researchers lost from the country at that 
career stage. Hence, in Table 6a, 15% of people who are now highly-cited physicists 
leave their country of birth to do their undergraduate degree; 17% do the equivalent 
at the PhD stage; 25% do so in between PhD and where they currently work. Table 
6b is not exactly comparable, because it draws only on scientists now in the United 
States, but it gives the same kind of picture. Table 7, on highly-cited bio-scientists, 
reveals something broadly similar, but interestingly the extent of the funnelling 
appears rather less than in physics. Whether this reduced mobility might be because 
of larger set-up costs of laboratories in biological science, as compared to that in 
physics, can only be one speculation.  
  
An important intellectual issue in the study of the brain drain is whether it might be 
good for world science for talented people to move to the rich science-intensive 
nations such as the USA. The argument here is a natural one (and was put forward in 
the Financial Times in 2007 by Larry Summers, formerly president of Harvard 
University – in economics this is termed an ‘externalities argument’). If scientists 
become more creative when working with other top people, perhaps by sparking off 
each other, then it may be beneficial to the global community, in the long run, to 
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have an elite brain drain. Individual donor countries may lose, goes this argument, 
but mankind as a whole gains from the new ideas so fostered.  Oswald (2007b), by 
contrast, raises the possibility that if most researchers go to the USA it may lead to 
too much homogeneity of intellectual approach. 
 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 report the h-index values of our ISI Highly Cited Researchers in 
both physics and bio-science. The tables break down the numbers into movers and 
stayers: these are the people represented in the Moved and Remained columns 
respectively. Intriguingly, we cannot find statistically significant differences across 
these kinds of movers and stayers. A similar kind of result is captured in Chart 10. 
 
Table 11 takes a different look at this issue for the case of the physicists. Here it can 
be seen that the h-indexes of scholars do not greatly vary across continents. 
 
Many factors influence the productivity of outstanding scientists, so it is natural to 
ask whether, once other influences are held constant, we can detect an effect from 
having migrated to a different country. In this spirit, a more formal test than earlier is 
set out in Table 12. This table provides two sets of regression equations. In the upper 
half of the table, the dependent variable is the h-index of the highly cited physicists 
in our sample. In the lower half of Table 12, the dependent variable is the total 
citations (summed over a lifetime) of these physicists. The independent variables are 
listed vertically. It can be seen – as we add extra variables, going from the left-hand 
columns to the right-hand columns – that the country in which an individual scholar 
works does not prove to be a statistically significant influence on his or her measured 
productivity. The only significant predictor of citations, whether in the form of an h-
index or as a total amount, is the number of years since a person had completed their 
PhD.  There is a chance here that Type II errors are being made. At 138, the sample 
size is fairly small, and those working in the USA have, according to the penultimate 
column of the upper half of Table 12, an h-index that is approximately 14% higher 
than others; but this number is not statistically significantly different from zero at the 
5% level.   
 
What Table 12 seems to show us is that elite brain-drainers are not noticeably better 
or worse than those elite scientists who choose not to leave their country. Whether 
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larger data sets than ours might in the future alter such a conclusion remains, of 
course, to be seen. 
 
Chart 11 explores data on another issue, which we call clustering. It examines the 
degree to which top researchers are clustered, in particular subject areas, in the 
world’s universities. We provide evidence that this is common. In other words, 
universities that have one highly cited mathematician or chemist are 
disproportionately likely to have another in that same field (and this is not merely 
because they are large or famous universities). This kind of clustering is actually 
clear informally when one goes through the web pages of www.isihighlycited.com. 
 
To provide a more systematic check, Chart 11 examines a sample of universities with 
either 2 or 3 ISI Highly Cited Researchers in them. If people are randomly distributed 
by subject, a duplication of field within this sample should be a rare finding. The 
reason is that there are 21 different scientific areas listed in the highly-cited website – 
therefore, given randomness, the probability of any particular field being found is, 
per person, only approximately 5%. Two brilliant people in the same area would only 
occur by fluke. Yet Chart 11 shows that the statistically expected number of 
researchers is not found in the data. Instead, a strong degree of clustering occurs.   
 
If we examine universities with 2 so-called HiCis, it is the case that for one-third of 
the time, those two individuals are both in the same scholarly area. Randomness, by 
contrast, would predict that the probability of this would be 1/21. In universities with 
3 HiCis, it is the case that for more than half the time, at least two of those people are 
in the same field. Under the null hypothesis of randomness, this proportion should be 
approximately only 1/7. For the figures, see Tables 13 and 14. 
 
The import of all this is that the world’s universities are, whether through accident or 
design, specialising in whom they hire. Some universities have heavy concentrations 
of elite researchers in subject X and none in subject Y, while others have those rare 
individuals concentrated within subject Y and nobody in subject X. It is not possible 
to know exactly why this happens. But a plausible part of the explanation is that 
brilliant people are attracted by the existence of top scholars in their particular field 
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of intellectual endeavour. The result is a highly uneven spread of talent, by field, 
across universities. 
 
4. Strategies for Universities and Governments 
 
 University strategies 
 
There are a number of reasons that might lead us to assume that it is in the interest of 
‘world-class’ leading universities to consider the implications of the mobility, 
funnelling and clustering of the top researchers.  A key, if not the key, characteristic 
of a world-class university is the quality of its academic and research staff.  This 
quality drives reputation and influence with the funders of research, within the global 
higher education and research community, with national and international 
governments and agencies; it enhances a university’s ability to recruit the best staff 
and students; it helps attract donors and commercial enterprises to their doors. 
 
Our analysis has used Highly Cited researchers as a proxy for the world’s best 
researchers.  This indicator, alongside other citation indices, is used within the major 
world rankings 5. As these rankings gain publicity and credibility, universities are 
turning to analysis of their own citation position.  They perceive the potential for such 
rankings as a major publicity tool to enhance global reputation and to attract and 
retain the best researchers.  Just as national rankings lead to game playing by 
institutions and manipulation of statistics, there is no reason to think international 
rankings will be immune. 
 
So how might world-class universities react strategically to the evidence of funnelling 
and clustering of top researchers? There are three major strategies: 
 
i) Grow your own (identify and retain the best researchers from an early 
stage) 
ii) Attract the best  
iii) Collaborate with the best 
                                                 
5 Shanghai Jaio Tong uses Highly Cited, Nature and Science; THES-QS uses citations. 
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i) Growing your own 
 
Our analysis has suggested that institutions and countries which attract the best 
researchers early on in their careers will have a higher chance of retaining them in 
their country of study6.  Institutions may decide to focus on strategies which will 
produce competitive demand for PhD or postdoctoral funding opportunities and 
nurture their best staff within their own research communities.  What the analysis 
does not demonstrate, however, is the sheer scale of investment in the next 
generation’s researchers required to produce one world-class researcher.  By 
definition, Highly Cited researchers are a rare breed.  This strategy is risky in terms of 
identifying the next generation of Highly Cited top researchers. It depends on 
significant amounts of funding being available to invest in a competitive scheme, and 
relies on an existing community of excellent researchers to attract the most excellent 
students and early career research staff.    
 
However, in terms of supply, there is evidence of growing internationalisation of 
university staff, demonstrating increasing mobility.  A recent analysis in the UK 
identified that 19.1% of university academic staff in post in 2005/06 were non-UK 
nationals. 7 A recent survey amongst Commonwealth countries provided an average 
of 12% of foreign nationals in the academic workforce.8  This is likely to be a 
consequence of the huge increase in mobility of students, funded from massive 
investment into higher education from growing economies in South East Asia, India 
and Africa.   
 
ii) Attracting the best 
 
By targeting the best researchers, universities invest in a known quantity.  The risk of 
identifying potential is reduced.  Universities could target Highly Cited researchers, or 
                                                 
6 There are also a number of other studies which have identified this phenomenon on a broader scale. 
An OECD report in 1999 indicated that 47% of foreign-born PhD graduates who studied in the US 
remained in the US. A recent report (2007) from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing 
claimed that 70% of Chinese-born graduates who studied overseas have not returned to China. 
7 UUK Policy Briefing (2007): Talent wars: the international market for academic staff 
8 Association of  Commonwealth Universities (2007) 2006-07 Academic Staff salary survey, 
London:ACU 
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identify potential through analysis of individuals’ citations alongside their other 
research achievements. This is an expensive strategy and also a highly competitive 
strategy.  Academic salaries need to be globally competitive and investment in 
research infrastructure will also be necessary.  Top researchers know their worth and 
will also be likely to consider a range of other factors such as the staff in the groups 
and department in the institution, and quality of life factors may increasingly come in 
to play with researchers in mid-career. 
 
Universities pursuing this strategy must ensure that academic recruitment processes 
are truly global and truly competitive.  Parochial and paternalistic advertising, 
appointment and promotion structures need to be addressed to ensure that institutions 
are able to attract the very best staff. 
 
The analysis on clustering of Highly Cited researchers suggests that institutions may 
benefit from targeting individuals from within particular subject areas, building on 
existing strength.  Appointment strategies may seek to attract whole groups of 
research staff to achieve this. 
 
 
iii) Collaborating with the best 
 
In recent years, critique of the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon has developed into the 
notion of  ‘brain circulation’.  This suggests that mobility is such that researchers may 
go back and forth between countries and develop global research networks which are 
not highly dependent on the location of individual institutions.  Given that the first 
two strategies are likely to be expensive and influenced by current reputation and 
staffing, a third strategy is to encourage and invest in short-term and visiting 
fellowships and scholarships, with a view to promoting longer term collaboration with 
current university staff and development of a continuing relationship and 
identification with the receiving university. 
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A report by Evidence Ltd9 identified that 45% of Highly Cited researchers currently 
located in the UK have spent time overseas during their careers.  This is a higher 
percentage of mobility than a similar comparison with the US, but is lower than that 
found in Australia and Canada. 
 
Fractional appointments held by an individual in two or more countries are not 
unusual and increasingly PhD and post-doctoral opportunities may be held 
collaboratively.  This strategy enables universities to grab a piece of the action and 
benefit from the interaction with the top researchers, without a significant up-front 
investment.  It requires a longer-term game which may bring some initial ‘quick-
wins’. 
 
Governmental strategies 
 
Strategies of universities cannot, however, be considered in isolation from 
governmental policies and strategies.  These will influence the ability of universities 
to act strategically and may determine the level of funds available to invest in those 
strategies.   
 
Higher Education has increasingly been the focus of economic, not just education, 
policies. Global competitiveness has led to increased targets for expenditure on 
research and development in key world economies: e.g. the EU target is 3 per cent of 
GDP by 2010; China’s target is 2.5 per cent by 2020. A highly qualified and skilled 
workforce is regarded as essential to a globally competitive economy. A globally 
competitive higher education system is regarded as a way to ensure the supply of such 
a workforce, as well as being a major contributor to research and development in 
terms of its staff’s output.   
 
Whilst developing countries have for many years invested in a skilled workforce by 
sending their best students abroad, governments have realised that this carried a 
significant risk that these graduates may remain overseas.  Governments therefore 
have turned to strategies to encourage students to remain at home (e.g. in India where 
                                                 
9 Bekhradnia B, and Sastry T, (2005) Brain drain:migration of academic staff to and from the UK, 
HEPI 
 25
investment has focused on securing 5 Indian universities that are regarded as globally 
competitive) or to return.  Recent policies in China and Singapore have been focused 
on providing attractive packages for returning graduates and skilled workers, e.g. new 
regulations were introduced in China in March 2007 to provide exemptions from 
household registrations for senior scientists, engineers and corporate managers. 
 
Other governmental strategies in evidence include focusing investment on centres of 
excellence (to promote clustering) e.g. CERN, the world’s largest particle physics 
laboratory, in Geneva, and strategies to exploit mobility e.g. Marie Curie fellowships 
in the European Union.   
 
Governmental immigration strategies can also influence the ability of institutions to 
attract world-class researchers.  The increase of the cap on the numbers of temporary 
visas available for highly skilled professionals by 80,000 per annum approved by US 
Congress in 2000 provided a boost for enabling staff mobility at a time of expansion 
for US universities (although it failed to achieve its target because of restrictions post 
9/11).  However, restrictions on dual nationality in a number of African states have 
been regarded as discouraging the return of highly skilled workers. 
 
Dependency on government funding will also have a significant impact on 
universities’ ability to act competitively.  Issues such as national salary frameworks 
and employment conditions are significant, but governments may also seek to 
influence behaviour to restrict or boost mobility. 
 
Finally, but significantly, governmental policies on the permitted parameters of 
research will influence the ability of institutions to attract the best researchers.  
Restrictions reflecting ethical, religious or political ideology may deter or simply 
prevent the best researchers from reaching a university, whatever the other attractions 
on offer. When the US clamped down on stem-cell research, a number of leading 
stem-cell researchers left for overseas. 
 
Institutions still find they have to work within national contexts in an increasingly 
globally competitive market.   
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper is a study of the elite brain drain. We hope that the paper’s findings will 
be of interest to those concerned with the state of world academic research, with 
brain drain issues, and with long-range university planning. Our paper is unusual 
within the literature because we concentrate on the migration choices of particularly 
distinguished scientists and economists. 
 
Partly by contacting the scientists directly, partly by using the source 
www.isihighlycited.com, and partly by the acquisition through web searches of CVs 
on individuals, we have constructed data sets on some of the world’s leading thinkers 
in three fields of inquiry. Our data cover 112 young economists, 158 senior 
physicists, and 163 senior bio-scientists. These data sets are not huge, but that is 
inevitable when the focus is on rare and iconoclastic individuals. Many of our data 
points are people who are likely to win Nobel Prizes in their fields.  
 
The background to this project is the attention now paid to the hierarchy of 
universities in the world. A growth in league tables, in this case across international 
universities, seems likely to encourage new and explicit status-ladders (indeed that is 
perhaps their purpose). Like other human beings, scientists care about status. At one 
level this is all just one more sign of globalisation. But the phenomenon of world 
league tables could lead to greater emphasis among researchers on where they work 
rather than what scientific research they do. Something like this has already been 
seen elsewhere in academia in the form of growing concern among researchers with 
the prestige of particular journals per se – what some have called an obsession with 
labels10 themselves – rather than about the quality of scientific discovery itself. In an 
increasingly electronic and globalised world, it might not be a surprise to see 
eventually an equivalent obsession with the prestige labels attached to university 
names. If so, that is likely to intensify existing mobility and global brain drain 
pressures.  
 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Monastersky (2005), Starbuck (2005) and Oswald (2007a) - all of whom point out 
that prestige journal labels are poor sufficient-statistics for quality and thus can mislead.   
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The paper’s main findings are the following: 
 
• There is evidence of a brain drain in elite thinkers. We document a 
remarkable funnelling of talent from a large number of donor countries 
into a small number of receiving countries. 
• Among ISI Highly Cited Researchers in the field of physics, for 
example, nearly 50% of individuals do not work in the country in 
which they were born. We document similar tendencies among elite 
bio-scientists and young economists.   
• In economics, there exists a striking exodus, after the bachelor-degree 
stage, towards the United States. We study this by collating scholars’ 
CVs. We show that approximately 75% of the assistant professors 
currently working in the top-10 US departments are in a sense not 
Americans. They did their undergraduate degrees in other countries. 
• At every educational stage, strong funnelling occurs – particularly but 
not exclusively towards the United States and Switzerland. These 
nations are, per capita, the world’s greatest net-importers of scientific 
brains. 
• In our sample of physicists, there appears not to be a statistically 
significant difference in quality – we measure this mainly with the h-
index – between those who move and those who stay. This differs from 
the general claim of Pierson and Cotgreave (2000) who focused, 
perhaps strangely, on citations per paper (their paper in Nature also 
noted, without comment, that stayers actually write more papers). 
• Funnelling occurs at each stage in scientists’ educational and 
professional careers. The coefficient of funnelling is approximately 0.2 
among highly-cited physicists and 0.1 among highly-cited bio-
scientists. Until more research on other samples is done, these numbers 
should be treated cautiously. 
• There is striking evidence that elite researchers tend to cluster together. 
Individual universities, in other words, often have their HiCis in only a 
few fields.  As an example, in universities with only 2 ISI Highly Cited 
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Researchers, we show in the paper that one third of the time both those 
people are in the same discipline.  
 
When distinguished scientists move, it is likely to be costly for donor countries 
and a boon to receiving nations. But it seems important to think more broadly. 
As Larry Summers has argued, allowing science researchers to cluster together 
may provoke positive externalities: people may spark off each other to the 
benefit of the whole academic discipline. Perhaps the discovery of DNA would 
have been slowed if the American James Watson had not been in Cambridge to 
work with the Englishman Francis Crick.   
 
Is the global brain drain a major problem for the world, a minor problem for the 
world, or perhaps even a benefit to mankind? Such a question is not easy to 
answer. Our data, however, fail to find a clear productivity difference (some 
years later) between the elite movers and the elite stayers. This is consistent 
with, although does not unambiguously prove, the idea that the brain drain 
creates no significant beneficial externalities for science. Those who advocate 
the brain drain as good for humanity as a whole need to show that moving 
makes a migrating scientist do better science. This may be true, and much more 
research, especially longitudinally, is needed. But we have not found evidence 
for such a claim. 
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Table 1:  The Data Set on Young American Economists 
Data on Assistant Professors in Major US Departments of Economics  
Sample Size: 112 
Ranking of Economics Departments 
Ranking Name of University Location of 
University 
Number of 
Assistant 
Professors in Our 
Data Set  
(Total: 112) 
1 Harvard University Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
14 
2 University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois 6 
3 Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology 
(MIT) 
Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
9 
4 University of 
California 
Berkeley, California 12 
5 Princeton University Princeton, New 
Jersey 
11 
6 Stanford University Palo Alto, California 16 
7 Northwestern 
University 
Chicago, Illinois 12 
8 University of 
Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
12 
9 Yale University New Haven, CT 9 
10 New York University New York City, 
New York 
11 
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Chart 1a: Distribution of USA-based Economists: Country of BSc 
Distribution of where the Bachelor of Science was 
obtained
Outside USA
75%
USA
25%
 
 
Chart 1b: Distribution of USA-based Economists: Country of PhD 
Distribution of where Phd was obtained
USA
87%
Outside USA
13%
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Chart 1c: USA-Based Economists: The Country of Their BSc 
USA-based Economists: Country of BSc
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Chart 1d:  USA-Based Economists: The Country of Their PhD 
USA-based Economists: Country of PhD
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Note: Economics Assistant Professors currently at Top 10 US Institutions gained their 
BSc within a wide range of countries. However their PhDs were overwhelmingly 
obtained in the USA. 
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Chart 2: Funnelling into the USA: The Movement of Highly-cited Physicists 
Sample Size: 158 
Error:   Country of birth missing: 20 (12.7%) 
BSc country missing: 7 (4.4%) 
PhD country missing: 0 (0%) 
Current country missing: 0 (0%) 
The movement of highly-cited Physicists through their career
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
born bsc phd current
Stage of career
USA
Rest of the
World
 
 
Actual figures for Chart 2 above 
Stage Percent in USA Percent in Rest of World 
Born 29.7 70.3 
BSc 43.0 57.0 
PhD 55.1 44.9 
Current 66.5 33.5 
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Chart 3a: Highly-cited Physicists: Gain and Drain by World Region 
Highly-cited physicists: 
Gain and drain by world region
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Chart 3b: Highly-cited Physicists: Data on Net Gainers 
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Note:  Chart 3b highlights the net gain of physicists within selected countries divided 
by 10,000 capita.
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Chart 4: Insights into Specific Country-Retention: Germany 
German Born Highly-Cited Physicists
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Note: Although German born physicists are drained predominantly to the USA, a 
larger proportion is retained. Also Germany does gain from other countries and 
therefore only incurs a slight net drain. 
 
Chart 5: Insights into Specific Country-Retention: UK 
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Note: UK born physicists are drained predominantly to the USA; a larger proportion 
is drained than retained. The UK does not significantly gain from other countries. 
Chart 6a: Movement of highly-cited physicists through their careers: Country of Birth 
Movement of highly-cited Physicists through career: Country of Birth
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Charts 6a and 6b highlight the movement of highly-cited physicists throughout their careers. They illustrate the observation that whilst many 
countries produce physicists they are funnelled to around half the original number of countries. Although only 30% of highly-cited physicists are 
born in the USA, 67% are currently located there. 
40 
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Chart 6b: Movement of highly-cited physicists through careers: their current country of employment 
Movement of highly-cited Physicists through career: Current Country
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Table 2: Data on Physicists 
 
Birth 
(32 countries) 
BSc. 
(30 countries) 
PhD 
(22 Countries) 
Now 
(16 countries) 
1st USA (29.7%) USA (43.3%) USA (55.1%) USA (67.1%) 
2nd UK (10.9%) 
Germany 
(8.7%) 
UK (8.9%) Germany (7.6%) 
3rd 
Germany 
(9.4%) 
UK (8.0%) Germany (8.2%) 
Switzerland 
(5.7%) 
Others 50% 40% 27.8% 19.6%11 
 
 
Table 3: Highly-cited Physicists – Overall movement 
Current location Frequency Percent 
In country of Birth 77 56.2 
Not in country of Birth 60 43.8 
Note: This table highlights the overall movement of highly-cited physicists from birth 
to current location. 
 
                                                 
11   The UK was ranked 5th with 3.8% of the physicists, after Japan which was 4th with 4.4%. 
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Table 4: Summary of the Physicists’ h-indexes 
No. Observations 158 
Mean 58.97 
Standard Deviation 13.52 
Minimum 22 
Maximum 115 
Median 57 
 
Chart 7: Mean h-index in physics by current country affiliation 
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Table 5: Productivity differentials between those who moved and those who did 
not 
Stage 
Average if not moved 
country since stage 
Average if moved 
country since stage 
Statistically 
different? 
Birth 60.69 57.66 No, t = -1.24 
BSc. 60.04 59.21 No, t = -0.36 
PhD. 59.19 58.38 No, t = 0.33 
 
 0 
Chart 8a: Movement of Current USA-Based Highly-cited Bio-scientists Before Entry to USA: Country of Birth 
Sample Size: 163 
Error:  Country of birth missing: 50 (30.7%), UG institution missing: 21 (12.9%), PG institution missing: 15 (9.2%) 
Movement of current USA-based highly-cited Bioscientists before entry to USA: 
Country of Birth
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Note: Charts 8a and 8b highlight the movement of highly-cited Bio-scientists before entry to the USA. They show the funnelling effect 
towards the USA as well as the UK. All the above Bio-scientists are currently employed in the USA therefore the funnelling continues 
post-Phd. 
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Chart 8b: Movement of Current USA-based Highly-cited Bio-scientists Before Entry to USA: Country of PhD 
Movement of current USA-based highly-cited Bioscientists before entry to USA: 
Country of PhD
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 Chart 9: Highly-cited Bio-scientists: Gain and Drain by World Region 
Highly-cited bioscientists in the USA: 
Gain and drain by world region
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Note: All the above Bio-scientists are currently in the USA. This highlights the 
overall gain of North America and the subsequent drain from all other regions.  
 
Figures for above highly-cited Bio-scientists currently in the USA 
Stage Percent in USA Percent in Rest of World 
Born 60.2 39.8 
BSc 69.7 30.3 
PhD 71.6 28.4 
Current 100 0 
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Table 6a: Funnelling coefficients for Highly-cited Physicists overall  
Sample: 158 
Stage % moving % remaining Funnelling Co-efficient 
Birth to BSc 15.3 84.7 0.15 
BSc to PhD 17.3 82.7 0.17 
PhD to Current 24.8 75.2 0.25 
Note: The extent of funnelling is determined by the percentage moving to a different 
country at each stage of their career (Birth, BSc, PhD, Current). The greater the co-
efficient the greater the migration. Tables 6a, 6b and 7 highlight this funnelling co-
efficient.  
 
Table 6b: Funnelling coefficients for Highly-cited Physicists – Current USA only 
Sample: 105 
Stage % moving % remaining Funnelling Co-efficient 
Birth to BSc 20 80 0.20 
BSc to PhD 17.5 82.5 0.18 
PhD to Current 100 0 1 
 
Table 7: Funnelling coefficients for Highly-cited Bio-scientists in the USA  
Sample: 163 
Stage % moving % remaining Funnelling Co-efficient 
Birth to BSc 9.3 90.7 0.09 
BSc to PhD 11.3 88.7 0.11 
PhD to Current 100 0 1 
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Table 8: Funnelling and the h-index for highly-cited Physicists overall  
Sample: 158 
Birth to BSc Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 61.75 57.08 66.42 
Remained 59.17 56.46 61.88 
BSc to PhD Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 60.08 55.53 64.62 
Remained 59.35 56.93 61.77 
PhD to 
Current 
Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 59.08 56.54 61.61 
Remained 59.08 55.07 63.08 
Note: Tables 8, 9 and 10 show the current h-index for those physicists who remained 
and those who moved at each stage. To allow some comparison with the USA-only 
bio-scientist data in table 10, table 9 is constructed using data on physicists currently 
in the USA. There is no significant difference (at 95% confidence) between movers 
and stayers within the two data sets. 
 
Table 9: Highly-cited Physicists – Current USA only  
Sample: 105 
Birth to BSc Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 63.82 59.05 68.59 
Remained 60.76 57.19 64.34 
BSc to PhD Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 61.67 55.33 68.00 
Remained 60.79 57.94 63.63 
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Table 10: Highly-cited Bio-scientists in the USA  
Sample: 163 
Birth to BSc Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 88.60 70.51 106.69 
Remained 89.67 82.80 96.54 
BSc to PhD Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved 83.38 78.13 88.62 
Remained 88.63 82.38 94.87 
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Chart 10: Probability of Moving Plotted Against their h-index: Highly-cited 
Physicists 
Probability of moving Vs h-index: Highly-cited physiciists
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Note: Chart 10 shows h-index against probability of moving. This probability of 
moving is calculated by country at each career stage for each individual. There is little 
relationship between the two in terms of highly-cited physicists. 
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Table 11: The Mean h-index Values for Migrating and Non-migrating Physicists 
Country BSc Country Now Number Average h-index 
Asia Asia 10 56.1 
Asia Europe 1 59 
Asia North America 6 55.5 
Europe Europe 31 56.1 
Europe North America 8 63.1 
North America North America 91 61.2 
Oceania Europe 1 57 
Oceania Oceania 1 54 
South America Europe 1 55 
South America North America 2 52 
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Table 12: Productivity Equations for Highly Cited Physicists 
(t-statistics in brackets; estimation is by OLS; bold indicates significant at the 5% 
level) 
 
Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of the h index 
 
Constant 
3.834 
(53.23) 
3.828 
(48.39) 
3.804 
(48.71) 
3.737 
(44.92) 
3.739 
(44.62) 
Years since  
Phd 
0.006 
(3.10) 
0.006 
(2.73) 
0.006 
(2.55) 
0.007 
(2.96) 
0.007 
(2.94) 
USA Born  
0.037 
(0.83) 
-0.049 
(-0.88) 
-0.063 
(-1.14) 
-0.071 
(-1.10) 
USA Phd    
0.131 
(2.56) 
0.058 
(0.95) 
0.051 
(0.75) 
Now in 
USA 
   
0.121 
(2.13) 
0.137 
(1.59) 
BSc outside 
USA * Now 
in USA 
    
-0.0186 
(-0.25) 
 
R2 
0.0579 0.0605 0.1045 0.1340 0.1344 
 
R2adj 
0.0519 0.0466 0.0844 0.1079 0.1016 
Number of 
observations 
158 138 138 138 138 
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Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of total citations 
Constant 
9.161 
(67.83) 
9.150 
(62.40) 
9.120 
(62.17) 
9.023 
(57.33) 
9.027 
(56.95) 
Years since  
Phd 
0.015 
(3.79) 
0.014 
(3.45) 
0.014 
(3.32) 
0.015 
(3.60) 
0.015 
(3.56) 
USA Born  
0.073 
(0.88) 
-0.034 
(-0.33) 
-0.054 
(-0.52) 
-0.071 
(-0.58) 
USA Phd    
0.163 
(1.70) 
0.058 
(0.50) 
0.044 
(0.34) 
Now in 
USA 
   
0.175 
(1.63) 
0.208 
(1.27) 
BSc outside 
USA * Now 
in USA 
    
-0.038 
(-0.27) 
 
R2 
0.0845 0.0906 0.1099 0.1273 0.1278 
 
R2adj 
0.0786 0.0772 0.0900 0.1010 0.0947 
Number of 
observations 
158 138 138 138 138 
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Chart 11: Evidence of High Levels of Clustering within Subjects 
Sample = All institutions beginning with “University” or equivalent on 
www.isihighlycited.com. 
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Note: This analysis uses www.isihighlycited.com. The first clustered columns 
represent universities with only two ISI Highly Cited Researchers in the whole 
university and the second clustered column is universities with only three ISI Highly 
Cited Researchers in the whole university. In the first case, the two researchers are in 
the same field for approximately one-third of the time. In the second case, for more 
than half the time at least two of the three researchers are in the same field. The 
statistically expected propositions are given on Chart 11 for comparison. Tables 13 
and 14 give further insights into the data used in Chart 11. 
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Table 13: Clusters of 2 out of 2 
Summary of findings Total 
Total sample of institutions 430 
Institutes with only 2 highly-cited researchers 67 
Number of these with 2 highly-cited researchers in same research area 24 
Percentage with same areas 35.8% 
 
 
Table 14: Clusters of 2 or 3 out of 3  
Summary of findings Total 
Total sample of institutions 430 
Institutes with only 3 highly-cited researchers 30 
Number of these with 2 or 3 highly-cited researchers in same research area 18 
Percentage with same areas 60.0% 
 
 56 
Appendix 1: Nobel Prize Laureates 
 
Table 15a: Among current highly-cited physicists, there are 7 Nobel Laureates in Physics. 
name hindex results avcite totalcite uniname born yborn bsc ybsc phd yphd 
current 
country age 
 Anderson, Philip 
Warren 75 289 135.45 135831 Princeton University USA 1923 USA 1943 USA 1949 USA 84 
 Wilczek, Frank  72 322 66.17 21307 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology USA 1951 USA 1970 USA 1974 USA 56 
 Tsui, Daniel C. 67 474 31.71 15030 Princeton University China 1939 USA 1957 USA 1967 USA 68 
 Gross, David J. 62 127 90.025 20242 
University of California, Santa 
Barbara USA 1941 Israel 1962 USA 1966 USA 66 
 Koshiba, Masatoshi  59 579 32.2 18645 University of Tokyo Japan 1926 Japan 1951 USA 1955 Japan 81 
 Stormer, Horst L. 56 214 56.23 12034 University of Columbia Germany 1949 Germany 1972 Germany 1977 USA 58 
 Binnig, Gerd K. 40 82 159.05 13042 IBM Zurich Research Laboratory Germany 1947 Germany 1973 Germany 1978 Switzerland 60 
 
56 
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Table 15b: Among current highly-cited Bio-scientists in the USA there are currently 8 Nobel Laureates in Medicine. 
Name 
h-
index D.O.B 
Country of 
birth UG granting institution PG degree granting institution Current Institution 
Greengard, Paul 131 12/11/1925 USA 
Hamilton College, Clinton, 
NY, USA 
Ph.D The Johns Hopkins 
University, Baltimore, MD, USA 
Rockefeller University 
Gilman, Alfred G.  110 07/01/1941 USA 
Yale University, New 
Haven, CT, USA 
Ph.D Case Western Reserve 
University, Cleveland, OH, USA 
University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center at 
Dallas 
Krebs, Edwin G. 100 06/06/1918 USA University of Illinois, USA 
Washington University School of 
Medicine, USA 
University of Washington 
Cohen, Stanley - 11/17/1922 USA 
Brooklyn College, 
Brooklyn, NY, USA 
Ph.D University of Michigan, East 
Lansing, MI, USA 
University of Arizona 
Brown, Michael S. 161 04/13/1941 USA 
University of 
Pennsylvania,PA, USA 
M.D. University of Pennsylvania, 
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Appendix 2: Qualitative insights from highly-cited physicists: UK leavers 
 
Q. We would like to know if British Physicists who emigrate go on to do significantly 
better research than if they had remained. This is obviously a difficult question to 
answer. But what is your opinion, in the case of your own work? 
 
“I left the UK to go to graduate school (at the University of California, Santa Barbara) in 
1965. I went with a "green card" (permanent resident visa) with the intention of becoming a 
US citizen. I had both professional and personal reasons for making this decision.  In 1965, 
the UK was in a downward spiral - the economy was failing because of frequent "wild-cat" 
strikes by the labor unions, and the rigid class system. The American research community 
was larger, more dynamic and much better supported. As a young scientist with a 
"working-class" background, I believed at the time, and still do, that my opportunities in 
the United States were much better than in the UK. After completing graduate school, I 
joined a large American company that had a strong commitment to basic research, and 
worked there for 23 years. The UK had few, if any, industrial laboratories of the same quality 
or size. I do believe that I have been able to do significantly better research in the United 
Sates than I would have been able to do in the United Kingdom. I also believe that I have 
done better personally. The level of support (equipment, infrastructure, financial support, 
etc.) is important, and I believe that this has been a significant factor in my success in the 
United States. Almost certainly, I would not have received the same level of support had I 
remained in the UK.” 
 
“This is a very difficult question to answer but, in my own case, I think that I probably did 
carry out better research in the US that I would have been able to do if I had stayed in the 
UK.  However, in my case, I think that working at IBM Research played a very important role 
in my research since I was better able to understand what's important in taking a fundamental 
scientific discovery into a useful technology.   The importance of much research today is often 
judged by its potential commercial impact.” 
 
“In my case I was fortunate to come to JILA soon after it was formed. Our AMO physics 
group, of roughly ten senior scientists, is now rated #1 worldwide ( with Nobel prizes in 2000 
and 2005 - and more to come!). In no way would it have been possible for me to have had 
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such outstanding colleagues and facilities in the UK. In fact my atrocious Norfolk accent  ( 
I was a country scholarship boy ) would probably counted against me in the early 60s.”  
 
“In my case, I had access to a much greater range of technology in my field of interest by 
moving to the US when I did (I moved to Bell Labs). There is no doubt that was helpful to my 
research. The environment in Bell Labs was also very conducive to doing good research 
because the work was relatively well supported financially without the continual need for long 
grant proposals. That particular research model is, however, almost dead. In my current 
work at a major research university, I also benefit from a strong depth of available 
technology, technology that is available because of the coexistence of top research in both 
science and engineering at one institution. That combination of the best science and the 
best engineering is a particular strength of some top institutions in the US, and is much less 
common in the UK, perhaps because of a lower perceived status of engineering there. 
Another benefit in the US compared to the UK is that there is not just one source for 
research funding with only one set of values defined by one group of people. None of us is 
smart enough to know the "right" answer as to what work should be funded, and a diversity of 
sources helps avoid narrowness of criteria for what is "good".” 
 
Key themes 
⇒ Class system in 1960s UK 
⇒ Realised more of their potential in USA 
⇒ More funding, facilities and emphasis on research area in USA 
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Q. And in the case of other scientists of whom you know, would you say that their work 
was improved by leaving Britain? 
 
“I am not in close contact with many British scientists (either those working in Europe or 
those working in the USA). However, my overall impression is that scientists from the UK 
who are now working in the US have done better work than their colleagues who remained 
in the UK. I also believe that scientists born in the UK who are now working in the USA 
have done better work, an average, than their American born colleagues.  The United 
States has also provided scientists born abroad with the opportunity to become leaders in 
the research community and research institutions. I am not personally familiar with British 
scientists who have come to the US in mid-career, and for this reason, it is difficulty to judge 
whether leaving Britain for the USA has improved the work of the scientists who I know 
personally. I believe that scientists who come to America from abroad are, on average, 
more ambitious, energetic and competitive than their colleagues who remain behind. For 
this reason, it is difficult to assess whether they have done better because of the advantages 
that America offers or because they are not representative of the research community that 
they have come from.”     
 
“Looking at my peers from my Cambridge and London, it is clear that those who came 
overseas had more opportunities and were much more likely to be successful scientists than 
those that stayed in the system. Indeed, many of the "top" scientists in the UK today have 
spent much of their early careers in the US.” 
 
“There is one other benefit of leaving Britain, which has nothing to do with the US being 
better than the UK; it is simply that it is more stimulating to move. The best end result here 
is not to want to stop people leaving Britain, but to have a healthy and balanced continual 
exchange of people.” 
 
Key themes 
⇒ Others have realised more of their potential in USA 
⇒ Cause and effect difficult to separate: do better academics go to the USA or do they 
become better because they go to the USA? 
⇒ The issue is not brain drain so long as there is brain circulation 
 
